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 Abstract 
Income support for working low income families (the “working poor”) is on top of the political agenda in 
Switzerland. The current social assistance system is considered inadequate to support working poor 
households. Labour unions propose the introduction of a general minimum wage, whereas the Swiss 
government promotes in-work benefits. Based on a structural labour supply model this paper provides 
microsimulation results of the effects of introducing different schemes of in-work benefits. It turns out that 
adding a minimum hours requirement to the current social assistance system is the most cost-efficient 
reform. Minimum wages are ineffective in fighting poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
In many European countries in-work benefits are either already implemented (e.g. UK, Ireland, 
Belgium) or discussed as a possible reform of the existing income support schemes (see Gradus 
und Julsing, 2000, for a recent survey). In-work benefits are characterised by making eligibility 
conditional on working. In most cases benefit reduction rates are smaller than 100% in order to 
make work pay. Switzerland, like Germany, still has an income support system characterised by 
implicit marginal tax rates of 100% (or above), thus lacking any work incentive for the recipients. 
This kind of income support system provides a guaranteed minimum income. There is a major 
difference between the German and the Swiss case, however. Switzerland has a much less severe 
unemployment problem compared to Germany. Hence, the main task for Swiss policy makers is 
not getting the unemployed back to work but supporting the low-income workers (the so-called 
“working poor”). Currently, the working poor are eligible for social assistance, but there is 
consenus that the current social assistance system is not adequate and not designed to support the 
working poor. The labour unions propose a (relatively high) general minimum wage as a 
solution. There is clear empirical evidence, however, that a minimum wage is not an useful 
instrument to fight poverty (see e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 1997). Hence, other instruments 
have to be considered, in particular in-work benefits similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) in the USA or the British Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). These two programmes 
differ in many details, but the underlying principles are the same. Families with low incomes 
receive tax credits given that at least one family member works. The WFTC also has a minimum 
hours requirement (16 hours per week).  
In this paper we perform microsimulations in order to assess the expected effects and costs of 
introducing in-work benefits in Switzerland. We analyse two tax credit systems: the first simply 
supplements the existing social assistance rules by a minimum hours requirement (guaranteed 
minimum income given positive labour supply). Households that are eligible for this tax credit 
face an implicit marginal tax rate of 100% for additional labour income. The second tax credit is 
designed as the British WFTC, with parameters adjusted to Swiss standards. The main difference 
between these two designs is that the first will increase each recipient household’s income 
exactly to the poverty line, and no household above the poverty line receives a tax credit. By 
contrast, the second design will leave some recipient households below the poverty line, and 
households above the poverty line may also receive a tax credit, given their income is below the 
4 
threshold defined by the parameters of the system. For comparison purposes we also simulate the 
expected effects of introducing a general minimum wage as demanded by the labour union. These 
simulations are based on the estimates of a structural household labour supply model. Not 
surprisingly, our results clearly indicate that tax credits are much more effective in supporting 
low-income households than minimum wages.  
The paper is organised as follows: the next section describes the Swiss benefit and tax system, 
the income distribution and poverty as well as labour supply in the year 1998. Section 3 develops 
a structural labour supply model for one and two-adult households. The data used in this paper 
are briefly described in section 4. Estimation results are discussed in section 5, and section 6 
contains simulation results for several policy reforms. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Social Assistance, Poverty, and Labour Supply in Switzerland 
This section provides a description of the current benefit and tax system in Switzerland, family 
labour supply and the income distribution in Switzerland, with special emphasis on poverty.  
2.1 The Swiss Benefit and Tax System 
Benefits 
Apart from unemployment insurance the main component of the Swiss benefit system for the 
working age population is the so-called “Sozialhilfe” (Social Assistance). The Swiss Conference 
for Social Assistance1 publishes guidelines defining minimal subsistence incomes differentiated 
by family size. Table 1 displays the current guidelines and their implicit equivalence scales. It is 
important to note that housing expenditure and sickness fund premia are not included in the 
subsistence level. These are reimbursed separately according to actual expenditure, up to some 
maximum. The final two columns display the poverty lines used in this study. They are 
constructed by adding median family size specific housing expenditure to the SKOS guidelines. 
The housing expenditure are computed using households with disposable income below median 
income, separated by household size and region. To compute poverty rates actual sickness fund 
premia as recorded in the data are subtracted from disposable income. 
                                                           
1  Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe, SKOS. 
5 
The SKOS guidelines are not mandatory. Each canton has its own social assistance regulations 
with different eligibility criteria, income thresholds, and levels of benefits. The basic structure is 
the same across all cantons, however: given eligibility, families receive the difference between 
their income and the threshold with an implicit marginal tax rate of 100% on additional earnings. 
Hence the current system has negative labour incentives. This problem has recently been 
acknowledged by policy makers and several cantons are planning a reform of the welfare 
system.2 In 1998 total expenditure for social assistance were approximately 2 billion CHF. This 
accounts for roughly 2% of total social security expenditure and for 0.5% of GDP. 
There appears to be a general consensus that the current social assistance is not an adequate 
instrument for income support of working low income households. Social assistance was 
originally designed as a temporary aid for families in financial emergencies. However, in the past 
social assistance became a long-term welfare instrument in many cases. Introducing tax credits 
may help to focus social assistance on its original purpose. Another point relates to stigma 
effects. There is evidence that take-up is relatively low ( c.f. Leu et al., 1997). Apart from stigma 
it may be difficult for full-time working persons to fulfill the obligations necessary to receive 
social assistance. Applicants for social assistance have to register with the social assistance 
administration and to report their financial situation periodically. Finally, some eligible working 
persons may not be aware of their eligibility. Tax credits do not have these problems; tax records 
are collected anyway, and the tax office can inform eligible persons about their tax credit (or 
simply deduct the tax credit from the tax bill). Hence it is to be expected that take-up will be 
much higher because there is less stigma and less administrative hurdles and costs. 
Taxes 
The main feature of the Swiss tax system is that federal taxes are only a minor component of total 
tax payments. The majority consists of cantonal and communal taxes that vary considerably 
across cantons and communities. Marginal tax rates are low compared to most European 
countries. The maximum marginal tax rates (including federal taxes) vary between 25% and 43%. 
Within cantons communities set the communal taxes as a percentage of cantonal taxes. These tax 
factors vary between 0.5 and 2. Couples can only file jointly. Hence secondary earners face 
relatively high marginal tax rates. This problem is alleviated to some extent by lower tax rates for 
                                                           
2  The canton of Basel-Stadt introduced the new welfare legislation in January 2002, which reduced the reduction 
rate of welfare payments to 66%. 
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couples, but there is still a marriage penalty with respect to income taxation. In general there is a 
deduction for children reducing taxable income. Again, this deduction varies considerably across 
cantons (between CHF 2’500 and CHF 6’000 per child). In one canton there is a deduction from 
taxes of CHF 400 per child. Child care expenditure are deductible in 11 cantons, but the 
conditions are rather restrictive (e.g. inability to work of one parent). In 13 cantons single parents 
are taxed according to the lower tax rates for married couples. In addition 22 cantons allow a 
deduction from the lower income if both partners work. Single parents are also eligible for this 
deduction. Again, these deductions vary considerably across cantons. 
This brief discussion highlights the fact that there is no “Swiss” tax system, but 26 different tax 
systems. Within these 26 tax systems taxes vary according to the communal tax rate. This 
complicates the analysis considerably. Our estimation and simulation model requires a tax-
benefit model to compute expected taxes and benefits. Given the complexities of the Swiss tax 
system we utilised a simplified tax-benefit model. We apply the tax factor of each canton’s 
capital to everyone living in the respective canton.3 Cantonal and federal taxes are computed 
according to the published tax tables. Communal taxes are the capital’s tax factor times cantonal 
taxes. 
2.2 Income Distribution and Poverty 
The primary focus of the present study is on the low income working households. The public 
discussion focusses on the “working poor”, usually without explicitly defining the concept of 
working poor. In this study a household is considered poor if its disposable income net of 
sickness fund premia is below the poverty line described in section 2.1. A household is working 
poor if total household labour supply is at least 40 hours per week and the household is poor as 
defined above.4 The drawback of this definition is that households who cannot work full-time for 
some reason are not considered as working poor. This is typically the case for single parents. 
Hence we also consider poverty among households with at least 50% employment and with at 
least 1 hour employment. Looking at the public debate there seems to be a consensus that apart 
from single parent households it is reasonable to require full-time work in order to qualify as a 
working poor household in Switzerland.  
                                                           
3  According to the Federal Tax Office this is a good approximation because in general the principal’s tax factor is 
close to the cantons average tax factor. 
4  We measure poverty on the household level because the poverty line is based on minimal subsistance levels 
differentiated by household size.  
7 
Poverty rates are displayed in Table 2. The base population consists of households with the 
household head neither retired nor self-employed5, where the household head is the person 
contributing the majority to household income. Of course, there should be no poverty if take-up 
were 100% and all cantons followed the SKOS guidelines. Obviously, this is not the case, for the 
reasons discussed in the previous section. The poverty rate in the base population is 4.9%, drops 
to 3.5% when only working households are considered and to 2.2% when only full-time working 
households are considered. In a large majority of the non-working poor households the household 
head is unemployed. The poverty rates differentiated by household type exhibit the expected 
pattern. Poverty is largest among single parent households, and above average for households 
with children as well. It is obvious how poverty is decreasing both in absolute as well as in 
relative terms when the hours requirement is increasing. About 75% of the working poor 
households with less than 40 hours are one-adult households, mostly single parents. 
Table 2 also provides some information on income inequality. The inequality index belongs to 
the family of General Entropy measures, with inequality aversion parameter α = -1. This index is 
sensitive to relative changes at the bottom of the income distribution. The pattern of inequality is 
very similar to the poverty pattern. Inequality decreases when the work requirement is increased. 
Interestingly, inequality is lowest among couples with children. 
Further descriptive analysis reveals two important findings: only about 40 percent of the main 
earners in the working poor population receive wages below the minimum wage demanded by 
the labour unions. This number clearly indicates that a general minimum wage of CHF 3000 will 
not be very effective in reducing poverty among the working households. The second finding is 
that increasing the poverty line by 10% would double both the poverty and the working poor rate. 
In other words, there are as many households being at risk of becoming poor as there are poor 
households. In-work benefits are often designed to also increase incomes of households above the 
poverty line and thus reduce the poverty risk of these households. 
                                                           
5  We suspect that the income data for the self-employed are problematic because measuring self-employment 
income is difficult, given that private and company income and expenditure are often highly entangled. 
Consequently, reported income is a bad measure for the household’s true financial situation. In addition, income 
data are not as detailed for the self-employed. In many cases the data contain only information on household 
income but not on the individual contributions to household income, making it impossible to compute individual 
wages (which are necessary for the labour supply model). Finally, when using monthly expenditure as the 
measure for welfare we find much smaller differences in the poverty rates of employed and self-employed 
households. Hence we decided to exclude self-employed households (i.e. households with the primary earner in 
self-employment) from the analysis. 
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2.3 Labour Supply 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of hours worked for single men and women as well as for men 
and women in couples (excluding self-employed households). These figures clearly reveal that 
married women are the only group with notable heterogeneity in hours worked. The percentage 
of part-time working women is large in international comparison (roughly 50%). Single women 
are to a little degree more often in part-time work than single men, who in turn have a higher 
percentage of part-time workers than men in couples. The figures also show that the modes of the 
distributions are at working hours above 40 hours, reflecting the fact that usual working hours in 
Switzerland are roughly 42 hours per week. Household labour supply in Switzerland is still 
dominated by the traditional system of a full-time working husband. Based on these distributions 
we restricted hours choices of men to nonparticipation, part-time (24 hours) and full-time (42 
hours). Women are assumed to have the choice in the set {0,8,16,24,32,42} of possible working 
hours. 
3. A Structural Model of Family Labour Supply 
The simulation of labour supply and income effects of hypothetical policy reforms requires a 
structural family labour supply model. Due to the complexities of the Swiss tax system and in 
order to simplify the construction of hypothetical budget constraints arising from the introduction 
of in-work benefits the model is set up as a discrete choice model. Hence we assume that the 
labour supply decision can be described as the utility maximising choice between discrete hours 
alternatives. For two-adult families the choice is between all combinations of possible labour 
supply states of each spouse. For each combination we have to compute the corresponding 
expected family income. We assume that the family maximises a joint utility function with 
family income and each spouse’s labour supply as arguments. Specifically, 
{ , }( , , ; )m fH H m fU U Y T H T H X= − − , (1) 
where Y is net household income, Hm and Hf are male and female hours of work, and X are 
household characteristics. Denoting gross wages as Wm and Wf and other household income as V, 
net income is given by 
{ , } ({ , },{ , }, ; )m fH H m m f f m f m fY W H W H V T H H W W V X= + + −  (2) 
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where ({ , },{ , }, ; )m f m fT H H W W V X are tax payments. 
Preferences over the hours choices are allowed to vary stochastically across individuals according 
to an extreme value distribution. The utility for some hours combination (.) (.)m fH H  can be written 
as  
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
*
{ } (.) (.) { }( , , ; )m f m f m fH H H H m f H HU U Y T H T H X ε= − − +   (3) 
where (.)iH  is a particular choice for individual i in the family. This implies that the probability 
that hours combination { , }j kH H  is preferred to all other combinations may be written as  
( )
( )
* *
(.) (.) , ,
{ , }
{ , }
1 1
Pr , Pr ,
exp , , ;
exp , , ;
j k s t
j k
s t
j k
m f H H H H
j k
H H
J K
s t
H H
s t
H H H H U U s j t k
U Y T H T H X
U Y T H T H X
= =
  = = = > ∀ ≠ ≠   
 
− − 
=
 
− − ∑ ∑
  (4) 
where J,K denote the number of choice alternatives for husbands and wives, respectively. 
Following van Soest (1995) and Blundell et al. (2000) we specify a quadratic utility function 
given by 
2 2 2
m m f f m f m f
m
YY H H m H H f YH m YH f H H m f
Y H m f f
U Y H H YH YH H H
Y H H
α α α α α α
β β β
= + + + + +
+ + +
  (5) 
Observed and unobserved heterogenetity is introduced by specifying 
 
0
'
0
'
0 ,
m m m
f f f
Y y Y
H H H
H H H
v
X
X
β β
β β β
β β β
= +
= +
= +
  (6) 
where (0, )Y vv N σ∼ . This specification turned out to be the best among a large variety of 
alternatives. The most general specification would be to make all β parameters a function of 
observed characteristics X plus an unobserved error term. However, once we control for observed 
heterogeneity in the βH terms there was hardly any significant effect of X left in βY. Making all β 
parameters random yielded volatile estimates. Hence we chose the above specification with 
10 
observed heterogeneity in the βH terms and unobserved heterogeneity in βY. This introduces 
considerably additional flexibility into the model and diminishes the impact of the extreme value 
assumption. Given these assumptions, conditional on Yv  and X, hours choices can be estimated 
by a multinomial logit model. The error term Yv  is incorporated by integrating the multinomial 
logit over its distribution, i.e. 
 (.) (.)( , | ) ln Pr , | , ( ) ,
j
jk m f
j kv
X d H H H k X v f v dvα β  = = = ∑∑∫"   (7) 
where f(v) is the density function of Yv  and (.) (.)1 ,
j k
jk m fd H H H H = = =  . 
As stated in the previous section we restrict hours choices of men to nonparticipation, part-time 
(24 hours) and full-time (42 hours). Women are assumed to have the choice in the set 
{0,8,16,24,32,42} of possible working hours. For one-adult households the model simplifies to 
the extent that only one hour choice has to be modeled, i.e. the set of possible hours is much 
smaller and the utility function is defined only on one labour supply dimension. 
4. Data 
The data used in this analysis come from the Swiss Income and Expenditure Survey 1998 (SIES). 
Over 9000 households participated in this survey conducted by the Swiss Federal Office of 
Statistics.6 The main part and purpose of this survey consists of a detailed monthly expenditure 
diary. The expenditure include tax and social security payments. In addition, information on all 
sources of income as well as labour supply of each household member was collected. At the 
moment the SIES is the only Swiss dataset allowing to estimate family labour supply models. In 
addition, since expenditure is observed it is possible to estimate life-cycle consistent models of 
labour supply (cf. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). 
In this analysis we concentrate on households in which the primary earner is employed or 
available for the labour market, i.e we drop households with heads who are self-employed (862), 
retired (2213), or in education (76). Furthermore, households with missing information on 
                                                           
6  The response rate was about 30%. Analyses using these data need to use population weights provided by the 
Statistical Office. Especially households with foreign heads not speaking one of the official Swiss languages are 
underrepresented in the SIES. 
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variables entering the model are deleted. The resulting sample sizes are 3485 for couples, 1174 
single female and 831 single male households. 
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the three samples. Single household heads are on 
average younger and better educated than the corresponding members of couple households. 
Single parents are in general female.  
Wages are predicted using a standard wage regression (selectivity corrected in the case of 
women). Estimation results of the wage regressions are presented in Appendix Table B1. All 
estimates correspond to expectations. In order to have a clean stochastic specification of the 
model predicted wages are used for all observations, including the employed. 
5. Estimation Results 
Tables 4 and 5 display the estimation results for two adult and one-adult households, 
respectively. These estimates are difficult to interpret directly. From a theoretical point of view 
the coefficient of income squared must be negative in order to have decreasing marginal utility of 
income. Hence the coefficient of income, βY, must be positive for positive marginal utility of 
income at H=0. These restrictions are satisfied by the results. The random coefficient βY has 
strong heterogeneity, as can be seen by the rather large estimate of the standard deviation of the 
distribution of βY. 
Regarding the parameters for hours it was not possible to estimate the coefficients of hours 
squared with any precision.7 The coefficients of the heterogeneity components have to be 
interpreted as shifting marginal disutility of hours of work given income and partner’s working 
hours in the case of couples. Hence a variable with negative coefficient increases the disutility of 
work. The estimates of the coefficients for the children related variables have the expected strong 
influence on the marginal disutility of work, especially for women in couples. Interestingly, 
marginal disutily of work for women in couples is smaller when either the woman herself or her 
partner have a high educational level. By contrast, men with a highly educated partner have 
higher disutilities of work. Overall, we find positive utilities of work for a rather large proportion 
of the sample. 
                                                           
7  Due to convergence problems the αHH terms are set to zero for all groups except married women. 
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Overall, the fit of the estimated model is good. In particular, we do not observe the overprediction 
of part-time working women and underprediction of full-time working women, which has been 
found in other studies (e.g. van Soest, 1995).8 
Table 6 shows the wage and income elasticities implied by the model. The elasticities are 
simulated by increasing wages and nonlabour income, respectively, by 10% and estimating the 
resulting changes in expected hours and participation rates. Participation rates are computed as 
the sample mean of the respective choice probabilities, expected hours are the sample mean of 
the choice probabilities times the hours values corresponding to the respective choices. Because 
the focus of the policy simulations is on low income households we present elasticities for the 
population of households with disposable income smaller than median income. 
The message of Table 6 is rather straightforward. The only group with notable elasticities are 
women in couples. However, even for this group the estimated elasticities are rather low. A 1% 
increase in female wages increases female hours by roughly 0.5%. In fact, income effects are 
estimated to be almost as strong as the wage effects, with the cross wage elasticity being much 
more important than the nonlabour income elasticity. These findings suggest that the labour 
market effects of the simulated reforms are likely to be rather small. The corresponding 
elasticities for the entire sample are smaller in absolute values. 
6. Simulation results 
In this section we simulate several policy reforms aimed at increasing incomes of low income 
families. The simulation procedure is as follows: for each household we draw a vector of 
unobserved utility components ε from the extreme value distribution and a value for βY from the 
estimated distribution such that utility is maximised at the observed category, i.e. we place each 
household at its chosen point. We then modify incomes according to the proposed reforms and 
compute the new utility maximising choice. This yields estimates of the effects of the reforms on 
labour supply, household income, and costs. This exercise is repeated 10 times. The following 
results are the mean over the ten repetitions. This simulation approach has been proposed by 
Duncan and MacCrae (1999).9 In all simulations we assume that only labour supply is affected by 
                                                           
8  The corresponding figures are available on request. 
9  Duncan and MacCrae (1999) note that the theory on applying discrete choice models of labour supply in 
microsimulations is underdeveloped. Neither aggregating choice probabilities over the sample nor applying the 
maximum probability rule are suited for microsimulations. The best way to proceed is to respect the probabilistic 
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the reforms. This is the common approach in this literature, but of course it is not entirely 
satisfactory. However, our data do not allow to model the labour demand side. We also assume 
that that all other programmes (especially social assistance) remain unchanged. However, given 
our design this implies that social assistance is as generous as the tax credit, but without the work 
requirement. This creates an incentive to stop working and to receive social assistance instead of 
the tax credit. However, these households did not receive social assistance before the introduction 
of the tax credits, so it is unlikely that they would do so when tax credits are introduced. We will 
come back to this point in the conclusions. 
There are many ways to design in-work benefit systems. Possible role models are the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the USA and the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK. 
Both programmes are discussed in more detail in the Appendix. The main difference between the 
EITC and the WFTC is that the EITC has a wage subsidy component at low incomes (in the so-
called phase-in region), whereas the WFTC replaces the phase-in region by a minimum working 
hours requirement of 16 hours per week.  
There is a small theoretical literature on the optimal design of income support systems. Important 
contributions have been made by Besley and Coate (1992, 1995) and Saez (2002). The most 
relevant for this study is the paper by Besley and Coate (1995). In their analysis the optimisation 
problem for the government consists in minimising budgetary costs of ensuring that each 
individual obtains a minimum income level. Individuals differ in their income generating 
capabilities. Besley and Coate show that if the government could observe these capabilities it 
could design individual specific wage or income subsidies that minimise costs (the first-best 
solution). But the government usually cannot observe these capabilities. Besley and Coate show 
that in this case the optimal design depends on whether the government can implement work 
requirements (workfare). If not, a negative income tax is optimal, but budgetary costs are much 
larger compared to the first best situation. If workfare is possible a guaranteed income system 
supplemented by a work requirement is optimal.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
nature of the discrete choice model by basing the behavioural simulation on predicted choice probabilities. For a 
two-state model this is rather straightforward, but it is extremely difficult to extend the approach to higher 
dimensional problems (cf Duncan and Weeks, 1998). 
10  It should be noted that Besley and Coate refer to workfare as public work in addition to work in the private sector. 
We do not consider the case that the government has to provide public employment programmes. Instead, 
workfare means in our case that individuals have to be working in the private sector in order to be eligible for in-
work benefits. 
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Saez (2002) analyses the effects of income support at the intensive (hours) and extensive 
(participation) margin of labour supply. He shows that if labour supply responses are 
concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer programme is a negative income tax 
with a substantial guaranteed income support and a reduction rate. If labour supply resonses are 
concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer programme is similar to the EITC 
with a negative marginal tax rate at low income levels and a small guaranteed income. His 
analysis is only for individuals, not for households with several potential earners. Introducing a 
work requirement in his model eliminates labour supply responses at the extensive margin. In this 
case, the predictions are very simular to Besley and Coate. 
Extensive preliminary simulations11 cleary indicate that the EITC does not appear to be an cost-
effective instrument in Switzerland. The main reason is that the primary objective of the reform 
in the Swiss case is not getting people from welfare to work through a wage subsidy, but helping 
employed low income households. This suggests that variants of the WFTC are probably better 
suited for Switzerland. Again, extensive preliminary simulations confirm this conjecture (these 
preliminary simulations can be found in Gerfin et al., 2002). These findings correspond to the 
theoretical literature on the optimal design of income support systems. 
There are many ways to design in-work tax credits with a minimum hours requirement. In the 
following we concentrate on two designs. The first Swiss Tax Credit for Working Families 
(TCWF) we evaluate is very close to the current welfare system. Each household below the 
poverty line will receive a tax credit such that the poverty gap will be closed. The only difference 
to the current system is that we impose hours requirements, either 40 or 20 hours per week. Note 
that this requirement refers to household labour supply, hence a household with two part-time 
working adults is eligible for the tax credit. This corresponds to the optimal design suggested by 
Besley and Coate (1995) when work requirement is possible. 
The second TCWF is designed similar to the British WFTC. To do so we have to set three 
parameters: the maximum benefit, the threshold for the beginning of the phase-out, and the 
phase-out rate. Given that there is no concrete reform to be evaluated we are relatively free in 
choosing these parameters. However, these parameters should conform as much as possible with 
current Swiss practice. Hence, we set the phase-out rate equal to 70% because this the value 
currently discussed (and implemented in the canton Basel-Stadt) as a replacement of the 100% 
                                                           
11  For these preliminary simulations we assumed that the reforms do not change behaviour. 
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implicit marginal tax rate on welfare payments. Furthermore, we set the income level at which 
the phase-out of the transfer starts equal for all households except for one-person households. 
Finally, following the current practice of the Swiss social assistance transfers are differentiated 
only by household size, thus giving children and adults equal weights in the implicit equivalence 
scales. In setting the maximum transfer level we use the SKOS guidelines (cf Table 1, column 2). 
Eligibility for the tax credit is conditional on working a specific amount of hours per week. Table 
7 summarises the parameters for the Tax Credit for Working Families which we denote as TCWF 
2. 
The advantage of the TCWF 1 is its effectiviness in fighting poverty: households receiving the 
tax credit are not poor anymore, and no non-poor household will receive the credit (there is, 
however, an incentive to reduce household labour supply in order to become eligible for the tax 
credit). The TCWF 2, on the other hand, is also paid to non-poor households, a feature common 
to all in-work benefits with phase-out rates smaller than 100%. In addition, for very low income 
households the tax credit may be too small to raise their disposable income to the poverty line. 
These features are illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the case of a family with the husband 
working full-time and the wife working 20 hours. Without tax credits this family is located at 
point g on its budget constraint. The TCWF 1 will increase family income to point d. Reducing or 
increasing the wife’s labour supply (up to point f) will not affect disposable income implying no 
work incentives for the secondary earner, given the primary earner works full-time. By contrast, 
the TCWF 2 increases disposable household income up to point e, which is still below the 
poverty line. In this case changing the wife’s labour supply would affect disposable income 
which can be increased above the poverty line. This is the reason why in the public discussion it 
is argued that this kind of tax credit makes work pay. Theoretically, however, it is well known 
that the labour supply effects of the tax credit is unambiguously negative.12 These negative effects 
are weaker compared to the TCWF 1, however. 
Finally, we also simulate the effects of introducing a mandatory minimum wage of 3000 CHF per 
month, as demanded by the labour unions. For part-time workers the minimum wage is adjusted 
correspondingly. This minimum wage has to be paid by employers. Hence the costs we compute 
are additional labour costs for the employers, not budgetary costs for the government. As stated 
above, we assume that labour demand is not affected by the minimum wage.  
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Table 8 summarises the main simulation results. We assume that households have to be full-time 
employed (i.e. household labour supply must be at least 40 hours per week) in order to receive 
the tax credit. This is a rather strict requirement which will be relaxed in the next subsection. It is, 
however, how policy makers and the public appear to perceive the main direction for reform, i.e. 
it is necessary to help those who do not have sufficient income despite working full-time (only 
for single parents a smaller work requirement is socially accepted). We measure the success of an 
instrument by its cost-effectiveness, which is defined as the mean cost per household out of 
poverty. 
The first clear result of the simulations is not surprising: introducing a general minimum wage is 
very expensive and ineffective in fighting poverty. Poverty among the working population is 
reduced from 3.5% to 2.9% (and from 2.2% to 1,7% in the full-time working population). Similar 
results have been found for several other countries (see e.g. Brown, 1999, Neumark and Wascher, 
1997, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher, 1999, 2000). Overall costs of introducing the general 
minimum wage are estimated to be 1’700 million CHF, but only 263 million actually go to poor 
households. These costs are additional labour costs for the employers. To put these numbers into 
perspective total expenditure for social assistance have been 2’000 million CHF in 1998 
(approximately 0.5% of GDP). 
The two tax credit programmes have almost the same costs. However, the TCWF 1 takes all 
recipients out poverty, whereas the TCWF 2 only about 50%, as can be seen from the poverty 
rate in the full-time working population. Consequently, the TCWF1 is much more cost-effective 
in reducing poverty with average costs of about CHF 9’000 per household taken out of poverty. It 
is instructive to compare this number to the mean poverty gap in the current situation (CHF 
6’400) which measures average costs of taking all households out of poverty ignoring any 
behavioural changes. In other words, the change in labour supply increases average costs by 
almost a third. This change can only occur in two-adult households given the full-time 
requirement for receiving the tax credit. This is reflected in the 0.7 percent drop of the female 
participation rate. This drop is also evident for the TCWF 2 which in theory has less negative 
labour supply incentives. Given the work requirement of 40 hours only couples have an incentive 
to adjust labour supply. Almost all changes in labour supply consist of married women stopping 
to work. This reduction in female labour market participation appears to be small, but considering 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12  In the plateau range the tax credit is like a lump sum transfer which only has a negative income effect. In the 
17 
that only roughly 2.5% of the working population are affected by the reform the labour market 
effect is relatively strong. It implies that about one third of the eligible households reduce their 
labour supply. 
It is a bit unfair to measure the performance of the TCWF 2 only by households out of poverty. 
The design of the TCWF 2 allows to increase incomes above the poverty line for pre-reform poor 
households. In addition households with pre-reform income slightly above the poverty line also 
benefit from the TCWF 2 which increases their income further above the poverty line. About one 
third of the tax credits goes to households not poor before the reform, and one third goes to 
households that remain poor after the credit. Hence only the remaining third actually goes to 
households taken out of poverty. The number of recipient households is twice as large compared 
to the TCWF 1. Thus the TCWF 2 also has an effect on households at risk of poverty, measured 
e.g. by having a household income between 100 and 110% of the poverty line. However, it is 
difficult to quantify this effect, and ultimately it depends on the preferences of society on how 
much income support for households above the poverty line is valued. 
Overall, these results suggest that the TCWF 2 is less cost-effective in reducing poverty 
compared to TCWF 1. In the next subsections we analyse whether this finding is robust with 
respect to changes in the hours requirement and changes in the parameters of the TCWF 2. 
Reducing the minimum hours requirement to 20 hours 
Table 9 displays the simulation results for the two tax credit systems with a minimal hours 
requirement of 20 hours per week. The main conclusions of the previous subsection are not 
affected by the reduction of the hours requirement. The TCWF 1 is still superior to the TCWF 2 
with respect to cost-effectiviness. Note that overall costs increase by roughly 50% but the effect 
on poverty is also much larger compared to the previous simulation. Consequently, in both cases 
there is only a small increase of the costs per household taken out of poverty. The negative 
effects on labour market participation are somewhat smaller compared to the previous simulation 
with a 40 hours work requirement, because now some non-working households are encouraged to 
start working by the tax credit. 
Overall, these findings suggest that at least in the present case the amount of work requirement 
mainly depends on society’s preferences regarding how much labour is reasonable in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
phase-out range the tax credit is like a negative income tax which as negative income and substitution effects. 
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qualify as working poor and not on cost-effectiveness considerations. Further simulations 
however clearly show that further reductions of the minimum hours requirement lead to 
substantial increases of the cost-effectiveness indicator.13 
Variations of the parameters of TCWF 2 
There is only few evidence on the “optimal” design of a tax credit in the spirit of the British 
WFTC. The parameters for the TCWF 2 (see Table 7) were chosen in order to generate transfers 
in the same magnitude as the existing social assistance payments. In Table 10 we present 
simulation results for systematic variations of these parameters. In the first case the maximal 
transfer is increased by 10%, and in the second case it is reduced by 10%. In the final case the 
plateau range is extended but the maximal transfer is reduced. The exact parameters are presented 
in Appendix Table B.2. The first column repeats the results for the TCWF 2 presented in Table 8. 
The results of these simulations are rather clear-cut. Increasing the maximal transfer by 10% 
leads to larger reduction of poverty compared to the base case, but costs are increasing 
overproportionally leading to a reduced cost-effectiveness. In addition we observe a further 
reduction of the female participation rate. On the other hand decreasing the maximal transfer 
implies a smaller reduction of poverty without a similar cut in costs. Hence the costs per 
household out of poverty are significantly larger compared to the base case. This simulation 
clearly shows that if success of a income support instrument is measured by households out of 
poverty the income support must be generous enough to get a significant number of households 
out of poverty. 
Finally, in the third variation we find the same effect on poverty as in the base case but at larger 
costs. Hence cost-effectiveness is inferior to the base case. Further analysis reveals that although 
the poverty rate is the same it is not the same households that are taken out of poverty. The base 
case appears to favour larger households compared to the third variation of the base case. This 
result indicates that the design of in-work tax credit has an impact on the structure of the 
remaining poor households. 
                                                           
13  Available on request. 
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7. Conclusions 
Income support for working low income families (the “working poor”) is on top of the political 
agenda in Switzerland. Labour unions demand a general minimum wage of CHF 3000, whereas 
the Swiss government promotes in-work benefits to boost incomes. In-work benefits are 
characterised by conditioning benefit receipt on working at least a specific amount of time. The 
current social assistance system does not have a work requirement and gives rise to a 100% 
implicit marginal tax rate for the recipients. This paper provides a microsimulation of the effects 
of introducing different schemes of in-work benefits in Switzerland. The microsimulation is 
based on a structural labour supply model estimated separately for one and two-adult households. 
We simulate two different designs of tax credits for working families (TCWF). The first simply 
supplements the existing social assistance rules by a minimum working hours requirement. The 
second TCWF is modelled after the British Working Families Tax Credit. It is characterised by a 
minimum hours requirement and a tax credit which remains constant up to a specific income 
threshold. For incomes above this threshold the transfer is phased out at a rate of 70%. 
The simulation results indicate that minimum wages are an ineffective and expensive instrument 
to fight poverty. Among the two versions of the in-work tax credit the first is superior when cost-
effectiveness is measured by average cost per household out of poverty. The estimated labour 
market effects of both designs are estimated to be almost identical. These findings are surprising 
at first sight because a priori one would expect the second design to be better, at least with respect 
to the labour market effects. However, conditioning eligibility on full-time employment provides 
sufficient work incentives, so the difference in the implicit marginal tax rate is not relevant. 
Reducing the work requirement to 20 hours per week does not change the main conclusion. 
Further reductions of the hours requirement, however, lead to more negative work incentives of 
the first design and steeply increasing costs. 
The second design of the TCWF affects incomes above the poverty line as well. Poor households 
can receive tax credits that push their incomes above the poverty line, and even non-poor 
households may receive tax credits, pushing their income further above the poverty line. These 
effects can be seen as reducing the poverty risk of these households, but they are neglected by the 
cost-efficiency measure used in this paper. If the society values these effects the evaluation of the 
two designs is not as clear-cut as suggested above. 
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Overall, our simulation results indicate that in-work benefits can be cost-effective in reducing or 
eliminating poverty among working households. They are relatively easy to administer and will 
probably lead to much greater take-up rates compared to the current social assistance system. For 
these reason, we belive that tax credits are a good instrument to support low-income working 
families. The introduction of in-work tax credits would allow to concentrate social assistance 
funds on the original purpose of social assistance, which is temporary assistance in case of a 
financial emergency. 
The research can be extended in several directions. There is the question whether the labour 
supply model with a joint utility function (the unitary model) is adequate. There is evidence that 
family labour supply should be a analysed in a collective model (c.f. Vermeulen, 2002), in which 
spouses divide household income according to a sharing rule. However, it appears that the 
empirical formulation of collective models is not ready for the kind of microsimulation presented 
in this study (especially the treatment of nonparticipation and children is underdeveloped). 
Another important question relates to the interaction of transfer programmes. In the simulations 
we assumed that all other programmes (especially social assistance) remain unchanged. However, 
given our design this implies that social assistance is as generous as the tax credit, but without the 
work requirement. This of course undermines the work requirement so either social assistance 
should be reformed as well or the tax credit should be made more generous than social assistance. 
On the other hand, the recipients of tax credits did not receive social assistance before the 
introduction of the tax credits, so it is unlikely that they would do so when tax credits are 
introduced. Hence we are confident that our results are reliable estimates of first stage effects of 
the reforms. Analysing second stage, i.e. general equilibrium effects is left for future research. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Poverty Lines and Equivalence Scales 
Household Size SKOS 
Guidelinea) 
Equivalence Scale Poverty Line Urban Areab) Poverty Line Nonurban Area b) 
1 1110 1 1999 1909 
2 1700 1.53 2863 2655 
3 2070 1.86 3255 3122 
4 2385 2.14 3633 3565 
5 2660 2.42 4036 3671 
6 2940 2.70 4316 3951 
7 3225 2.98 4601 4236 
8 3505 3.26 4881 4516 
9 3785 3.53 5161 4796 
a) SKOS: Swiss Conference for Welfare. The figures are the sum of the primary basic needs and the mean of the so 
called secondary basic needs. All figures in CHF, 1 CHF ≈ 0.68€. 
b) Computed as the sum of the guideline in column 2 and median housing expenditure of households with income below 
median income, separated by household size and region 
Table 2: Poverty Rates, Excluding Self-Employed 
No Children  All 
Singles Couples 
Couples with 
children 
Single 
Parents 
More than 2 
adults 
 All households 
Poverty Rate 4.9 
(98’000) 1 
4.8 2.5 4.9 25.7 2.6 
Inequality 126.7 94.4 81.7 65.6 172.9 74.1 
 Working  
Poverty Rate 3.5 
(69’000) 1 
3.6 1.8 4.6 14.8 2.1 
Inequality 109.4 81.3 73.9 61.6 79.3 67.8 
 Working at least 20 Hours per Week 
Poverty Rate 2.9 
(57’000) 1 
2.5 1.6 4.0 11.8 1.9 
Inequality 101.8 71.6 69.3 61.2 77.0 62.6 
 Working at least 40 Hours per Week 
Poverty Rate 2.2 
(38’000) 1 
1.4 1.3 3.4 7.3 1.4 
Inequality 92.1 66.2 65.8 55.9 73.8 59.1 
 
Own calculations based on the SIES 1998. Full Sample: Working age population, neither in education nor retired. Poverty Lines 
are as in Table 2.1. Disposable income is net of sickness fund premia. All figures have been computed using sampling 
weights. Inequality is measured with the General Entropy (GE) measure with parameter α set to –1. This measure is 
sensitive to variations at the bottom of the income distribution 
1 Absolute number of poor households 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Two Adult Households Single Female 
Households 
Single Male Households 
 Husband Wife   
Participation Rate 98.0 64.1 93.0 95.9 
Hours of Work (all) 40.7 17.1 33.5 38.7 
Hours of Work (H>=0) 41.5 26.7 36.3 40.3 
Age  40.9 38.2 38.9 36.8 
Low Education 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.02 
High Education 0.38 0.23 0.32 0.40 
Foreigner 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.13 
Hourly Wage 39.5 29.1 30.7 35.4 
Net Household Income (per month) 7835.3 4644.8 5338.4 
Number of Children 1.0 0.32 0.04 
Children younger than 4 0.22 0.03 0.002 
Children between 4 and 5 0.14 0.03 0.00 
Children between 6 and 12 0.29 0.11 0.01 
Number of observations 3485 1174 831 
Note: Own calculations 
Table 4: Estimation Results, Two-Adult Households 
 Full Model 
 Estimate Std.Error 
Income squared -0.83 0.11 
Male Hours x Income 0.32 0.07 
Female Hours x Income 0.09 0.05 
Female Hours Squared 0.13 0.01 
Female Hours x Male Hours -0.16 0.02 
Female Hours 0.03 0.12 
    x (age-40) -0.03 0.001 
    x (age-40) squared -0.08 0.02 
    x 1(high education male) 0.02 0.04 
    x 1(high education female) 0.32 0.06 
    x Number of Children -0.37 0.02 
    x 1(Child younger than 4) -0.65 0.04 
    x 1(Children between 4 and 5) -0.33 0.05 
    x 1(Foreigner) 0.23 0.04 
Male Hours 1.41 0.13 
    x (age-40) -0.01 0.003 
    x (age-40) squared -0.08 0.03 
    x 1(high education male) 0.06 0.08 
    x 1(high education female) -0.31 0.10 
    x Number of Children 0.01 0.04 
    x 1(Child younger than 4) -0.42 0.08 
    x 1(Children between 4 and 5) -0.30 0.10 
    x 1(Foreigner) -0.49 0.06 
Income 2.98 0.43 
σβY 1.44 0.17 
Log Likelihood -6242.95 
Sample Size 3485 
Robust standard errors. Simulated Maximum Likelihood with 100 repetitions. Income and Hours 
are per week, divided by 1000 and 10, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results, One-Adult Households 
 Single Men Single Women 
 Estimate Std.Error Estimate Std.Error 
Income squared -2.00 0.60 -2.16 0.54 
Hours x Income -0.72 0.36 -0.45 0.22 
Hours 0.27 0.33 0.77 0.31 
    x (age-40) -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
    x (age-40) squared 0.23 0.10 -0.04 0.06 
    x 1(high education) 0.08 0.30 0.16 0.19 
    x Number of Children 0.06 0.38 -0.58 0.09 
    x 1(Child younger than 4) -  -1.26 0.41 
    x 1(Children between 4 and 5) -  -0.99 0.36 
    x 1(Foreigner) -0.30 0.30 0.13 0.24 
Income 21.22 4.87 13.21 1.87 
σβY 9.35 2.17 6.02 0.88 
Log Likelihood -385.865 -1344.675 
Sample Size 831 1174 
Robust standard errors. Simulated Maximum Likelihood with 100 repetitions. Income and Hours 
are per week, divided by 1000 and 10, respectively. 
Table 6: Simulated Wage and Income Elasticities for Households with equivalent income less 
than median equivalent income 
 Single Women Single Men Women in Couples Men in Couples 
10% increase of male wages     
    Hours Elasticity  0.02 -0.43 0.03 
   Participation Elasticity  0.001 -0.26 0.01 
10% increase of female wages     
    Hours Elasticity 0.07  0.56 -0.01 
    Participation Elasticity 0.01  0.36 -0.003 
10% increase of nonlabour income     
    Hours Elasticity -0.04 -0.001 -0.06 -0.001 
    Participation Elasticity -0.01 -0.0003 -0.04 -0.000 
Simulated elasticities based on parameter estimates in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 7: Parameter of the TCWF 2 
Household Size  Maximal Transfer  
(= SKOS-Basic Needs I + II)  
Plateau-End  
1 1110 800 
2 1700 1000 
3 2070 1000 
4 2375 1000 
5 2660 1000 
6 2940 1000 
7 3225 1000 
8 3505 1000 
 
Table 8: Simulated Effects of the Programmes with 40 Hours Work Requirement 
 Current 
Situation 
General Minimum 
Wage of CHF 
3000 
Tax Credit for 
Working Families 1 
(TCWF 1) 
Tax Credit for 
Working Families 2 
(TCWF 2) 
Poverty Rate (in %)1 3.5 
(2.2) 
2.9 
(1.7) 
1.4 
(0.0) 
2.5 
(1.0) 
Mean Poverty Gap per year  
(in CHF)1 
7250 
(6'400) 
6600 
(4'900) 
8300 
(0) 
6000 
(2'700) 
Total Costs of Programme per year2 
(in Mio. CHF.) 
 1’700 
(263)3 
360 370 
Mean Costs per Household out of 
Poverty per year (in CHF) 
 216’000 
(33'000)3 
9000 19’000 
∆ Labour Market Participation in %     
    Men   0 0 0 
    Women   0 -0.7 -0.7 
Source: EVE 98, own calculations.  
1 Poverty rate and poverty gap in working population (in full-time working population) 
2 Cost for minimum wages are gross costs for the employers. 
3 The figures in parantheses refer to poor full-time working households. Approximately 100 Million CHF go to poor 
households working less than 40 hours per week. 
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Table 9: Simulated Effects of TCWF with 20 Hours Work Requirement 
 Current 
Situation 
Tax Credit for Working 
Families 1 (TCWF 1) 
Tax Credit for Working 
Families 2 (TCWF 2) 
Poverty Rate (in %)1 3.5 
(2.9) 
0.6 
(0.0) 
1.9 
(1.3) 
Mean Poverty Gap per year  
(in CHF.)1 
7250 
(6’600) 
9800 
(0) 
4400 
(2’700) 
Total Costs of Programme per year (in Mio. 
CHF.) 
 559 605 
Mean Costs per Household out of Poverty 
per year (in CHF) 
 10’000 20’000 
∆ Labour Market Participation in %    
    Men  0 0 0 
    Women  0 -0.4 -0.5 
Source: EVE 98, own calculations. 
1 Poverty rate and poverty gap in working population (in population working at least 20 hours) 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Simulation results for alternative designs of TCWF 2 
  
TCWF 2 
1: 
Increase of 
maximal transfer 
by 10% 
2: 
Decrease of 
maximal transfer 
by 10% 
3: 
Extension of 
plateau range and 
decrease of 
maximal transfer 
 
Poverty Rate (in %)1 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.0 
Mean Poverty Gap per year  
(in CHF)1 
2’700 2’000 2’800 3’100 
Total Costs of Programme  per year (in Mio. 
CHF.) 
370 669 285 449 
Mean Costs per Household out of Poverty 
per year (in CHF) 
19’000 22’000 25’000 23’000 
∆ Labour Market Participation in %     
    Men  0 0 0 0 
    Women  0.7 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 
Source: EVE 98, own calculations.  
See Table A.1 for details regarding the parameters chosen for this simulation 
1 In full-time working population 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of Hours Worked 
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Figure 2: Illustration of the two Tax Credits for Working Families 
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Appendix A: Brief Description of extisting in-work benefit systems in 
the USA and UK 
Earned Income Tax Credit: The Earned Income Tax Credit began in 1975 as a modest program 
aimed at offsetting the social security payroll tax for low-income families with children. As 
discussed more below, the generosity of the EITC increased in tax acts of 1986, 1990, and 1993. 
The contrasts between the EITC and traditional welfare benefits are many. First, the EITC is 
provided through the tax system rather than the welfare system. Second, eligibility for the EITC 
is available to all low-income families with children, independent of marital status. Third, receipt 
of the credit requires positive family earnings. Consequently, the EITC creates positive incentives 
to work for single parent families. Because the credit is based on family earnings, however, the 
credit can create adverse incentives to work among married couples. 
Eligibility for the EITC depends on the taxpayer’s earned income (or in some cases adjusted 
gross income), and the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relationship and 
residency tests. The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the taxpayer's 
earned income, adjusted gross income, and, since 1991, the number of EITC-eligible children in 
the household. There are three regions in the credit schedule. The initial phase-in region transfers 
an amount equal to the subsidy rate times their earnings. In the flat region, the family receives the 
maximum credit. In the phase-out region, the credit is phased out at some phase-out rate. 
Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC): Introduced in 1988, the Family Credit was an extension of 
FIS and was designed to increase generosity and remove tax rates in excess of 100%. It achieved 
the later objective by fully integrating the in-work credit with the rest of the tax and benefit 
system. An unusual feature of the Family Credit system, retained from the FIS, was the minimum 
weekly hours eligibility criterion. At its introduction this was set at 24 hours but then reduced to 
16 in April 1992 to encourage part-time work by lone parents with young children. FIS had a 
minimum hours criteria set at 30 hours for workers in couples and 24 hours for single parents. To 
partially offset any adverse incentive effects for full time work from these lower hours eligibility 
levels, a further supplementary credit at 30 hours per week was introduced in April 1995. In the 
FC system each eligible family was paid a credit up to a maximum amount that depends on the 
number of children. Eligibility depended on family net income being lower than some threshold 
(£79.00 per week in 1998-99). As incomes rose the credit was withdrawn at a rate of 70%. 
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The replacement of FC – the WFTC – was substantially more generous and was fully phased in 
from April 2000. It increased the level of in-work support relative to the FC system in four ways: 
by enhancing the credit for younger children; by increasing the threshold; by reducing the benefit 
reduction rate from 70% to 55%; and by incorporating a new childcare credit of 70% of actual 
childcare costs up to a quite generous limit. 
Figure A.1 displays the amount of EITC and WFTC for a family with two children. It is obvious 
that the WFTC is more generous than the EITC at lower incomes (if the family is eligible, i.e. 
works more than 16 hours per week). On the other hand, more people benefit from the EITC. 
Obviously, the EITC also creates smaller work disincentives in phase-out region than the WFTC. 
But this is also a problem of the EITC. The EITC is a rather expensive instrument, and more than 
50% of those receiving the EITC are not poor.  
The empirical evidence on the labour market effects of the EITC are rather clear-cut and 
summarised in Scholz and Hotz (2001). For one-adult households an increase in the labour 
market participation rate of 2–3 percentage points is estimated.. This corresponds to an elasticity 
of about 1. Meyer und Rosenbaum (1999) estimate that about 63% of the increase in the labour 
market participation rate of lone mothers between 1984 and 1996 can attributed to the EITC. At 
the same time the empirical evidence clearly indicates the negative effects of the EITC on the 
labour market participation of spouses and on the working hours of those already employed. 
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) estimate a reduction of about 1.2 percentage points of the participation 
rate of married women. Labour supply of husbands decreases by about 2 percent, whereas wives’ 
labour decreases by 1 to 6 percent, depending on the region of the EITC in which the household 
is without the wife’s income. The strongest effects are found in the phase-out region. 
The simulation results in Blundell et al (2000) indicate modest labour supply effects of the 
British WFTC. Ex post analyses are not available at the moment. 
31 
Figure A.1: EITC and WFTC for families with two children 
EITC and WFTC for families with 2 children
(Exchange rate £1:$1.50, hourly wage=$3.60)
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Based on Table 3.2 of Blundell and Hoynes (2001). 
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Appendix B: Tables 
Table B.1: Wage regression (dependent variable: log of hourly wage) 
 Men Women 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept 0.9674 0.3324 0.5158 0.3971 
Age 0.1336 0.0253 0.1779 0.0324 
Age Squared/100 -0.25 0.06 -0.41 0.08 
Age Cubed/1000 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.003 
Secondary Level I 0.1879 0.0253 0.2348 0.0249 
Secondary Level II 0.3669 0.0335 0.4755 0.0297 
Tertiary Level 0.4734 0.0261 0.5362 0.0311 
Education unknown 0.3596 0.0956 0.1277 0.1178 
Region Lemanique 0.0548 0.0191 0.0661 0.0233 
Zurich 0.1125 0.0189 0.1080 0.0232 
Northwest 0.0954 0.0195 0.0941 0.0245 
East 0.0488 0.0202 0.0308 0.0261 
Central 0.0082 0.0228 0.0394 0.0288 
Ticino -0.0079 0.0251 -0.0767 0.0336 
Urban  0.0322 0.0132 0.0406 0.0169 
Foreigner -0.1358 0.0172 -0.0804 0.0220 
Selection Correction -  0.054 0.018 
R squared 0.36  0.21  
Number of observations 4799  3741  
The selection equation for women included number of children and nonlabour income as additional variables. 
 
Table B.2: Variations of the TCWF2 Parameters 
 Unchanged Plateau Range; Variations of maximum transfer Longer Plateau Range, Decrease of 
Maximum Transfer 
  1 2 3 
Family Size End Plateau Increase of maximum 
transfer by 10% 
Decrease of maximum 
transfer by 10% 
End Plateau Maximum Transfer 
1 800 1221 999 1800 800 
2 1000 1870 1530 1800 1224 
3 1000 2277 1863 1800 1488 
4 1000 2612.5 2137.5 1800 1712 
5 1000 2926 2394 1800 1936 
6 1000 3234 2646 1800 2160 
7 1000 3547.5 2902.5 1800 2384 
8 1000 3855.5 3154.5 1800 2608 
9 1000 4163.5 3406.5 1800 2824 
 
